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DOES THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE PASS THE LEMON
TEST?
MONTE KULIGOWSKI*
I
INTRODUCTION

I

n 2004, Walt Disney Pictures released the motion picture,
“National Treasure.”1 The main character, Benjamin Gates,
discovers that the United States Declaration of Independence
contains a treasure map on the backside of its old parchment, leading
to unfathomable wealth of unprecedented historic significance. Gates
discovers the symbols of the map because they are not apparent to the
natural eye. One must look through a special lens to find the treasure.
So it is with the real Declaration. We need not look to fantasy to
discover unfathomable wealth of unprecedented historic significance.
Hidden from the dualistic, secular eye, we find in the document the
secret of our country’s greatness.
America’s national treasure has always been her faith in God. Not
a ceremonial faith, but a real, substantive faith—a faith so strong that
it is self-evident that our rights are from God. It is a faith that believes
the Creator of mankind is actually there and even national
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1. NATIONAL TREASURE (Walt Disney Pictures 2004).
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governments are wise in acknowledging and imploring His kind
assistance and protection.
The Declaration is not a petition of redress; it is a document of
interposition, where government representatives assert the rights of
the populace against the wishes of the presently controlling, albeit
oppressive, government.2 The Declaration declares a complete
dissolving of allegiance, and thus, it provides the rudiments of true
freedom, starting from a blank sheet, so to speak. “Our Revolution,”
reflects Thomas Jefferson in 1824, “presented us with an album on
which we were free to write what we pleased. We had no occasion to
search into musty records, to hunt up royal parchments, or to
investigate the laws and institutions of a semi-barbarous ancestry.
We appealed to those of nature, and found them engraved on our
hearts.”3
The foundational thesis of the Declaration is uncomplicated, yet
overwhelming: fundamental laws and rights are from God and no
king is above the law.
As you read on, bear in mind the significance of the preeminent
document that will be scrutinized in this Article. The Declaration’s
quill pen symbols of meaning provided the very foundation for the
United States Constitution. Indeed, the Declaration is the
constitution of the Constitution. The Declaration cannot be severed
from the Constitution without draining the lifeblood from the latter.
Without the former, the latter does not become a living Constitution,
but a dead one.

2. The adverse response to the petitions of redress of the first Continental Congress led to
the measures of the second Continental Congress.
3. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (June 5, 1824), in 16 THE WRITINGS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 45–46 (Andrew A. Lipscomb & Albert E. Bergh eds., 1905).
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Without the Declaration, the Constitution has no transcendent
point of reference for meaning and purpose. And without application
of the principles and convictions contained in the Declaration during
judicial constitutional analysis, court rulings on matters of religion
are often at odds with, and unable to support, the values of the
individual communities across the country. Hence, contemporary
jurisprudence has not produced a living diversity, but a dying
conformity to centralized decrees.
It is important to remember that for approximately the first 150
years of the country’s short history, establishment claims were sparse
and related only to congressional spending and religion.4 A majority
of the states had not attempted to nationally establish the majority
religion in the constitutionally forbidden manner—through an act of
Congress.
Nevertheless, with the advent of Everson v. Board of Education5 in
1947—where the U.S. Supreme Court casually reached back seventynine years to the Fourteenth Amendment6 to apply the 156 year-old
federalism Establishment Clause against the states7—earth-shaking
change was forthcoming.
4. The only two direct Establishment Clause cases prior to Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U.S. 1 (1947), were Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899), and Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210
U.S. 50 (1908). Both cases involved federal aid and religion, and neither ruling found that the
federal government had established religion.
5. 330 U.S. 1, 8 (1947).
6. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, ratified July 9, 1868.
7. For a comparison, see Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925), where, although the
Court did not incorporate the First Amendment, it stated: “[W]e do assume that freedom of
speech and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgment by
Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States.” The religion clause was
unaffected until 1940, and its Establishment Clause was incorporated in 1947. See Cantwell v.
Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (stating in a free exercise matter, the Fourteenth
Amendment “embraces the [religious] liberties” of the First Amendment); see also Murdock v.
Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943) (ruling that, on the authority of the Free Exercise Clause, the
City of Jeannette could not require a religious group to purchase a business license for books and

H 289 I

05__KULIGOWSKI.DOC

VOL. 2

11/1/2007 3:56:30 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2007

At first, on the Court’s brave new course of meddling in state
matters of religion, the pre-quake tremors were barely noticeable.
But in the early 1960s, the time-honored religious traditions of the
states, municipalities, and even school districts would be met with
federal disapproval. Application of the doctrine of incorporation
meant that any practice the Supreme Court deemed impermissible,
in any local school district, for example, became unlawful for every
school district across the country.
The localities became
nationalized. The country was (and continues to be) forced to
become homogeneous. Ironically, the religious homogeneity of the
country was the very problem the Court was trying to fix (herein one
will find the catalyst for the new rules of Establishment Clause
interpretation).
After decades of declaring public religious
expression unconstitutional at the state and local level (most notably
in the educational institutions that transmit values), new,
postmodern,
post-Christian
generations
have
emerged.
Approximately sixty years later, we find a new, homogeneous
America; only now it is, or is at least becoming, a secular nation,
having no real connection to its own past.
Once public perception on church and state (really, God and
state) had changed, as well as religious thinking in general, first in the
Supreme Court (and with the intelligentsia) and then throughout
every locality in the country, it became a matter of time before the
citizenry would turn to challenge the religious tradition at the federal
level. Presently, nothing is self-evident, including the conviction that
our rights are from God—or that the hand of Divine blessing and
protection of our country is necessary for our happiness and
posterity. There no longer exists much of a connection between the
pamphlets sold in the course of door-to-door proselytizing). For discussion of the doctrine of
incorporation, see infra section V.
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religious relics and language of our past and their once-exalted
status. Thus, we have seen and will continue to see challenges to
government chaplaincy, proclamations, congressional prayer, the flag
pledge, the national motto, monuments, oaths of office, and so on.
We are now beginning to see the Supreme Court in a position
where it must attempt to prevent the absurd (arguably, further
absurdities) from occurring. The problem the Court faces is that it
cannot stop the logical conclusions of its own rulings. To be
consistent, even the Court’s own religious inscriptions (the Ten
Commandments, et al) must come down from its courthouse, and its
opening prayers must cease. The Court has opened the floodgates
through its rulings and now finds itself vainly bailing water with its
own problematic precedent. Activists armed with legal precedent
have every reason to believe they can erase every remaining vestige of
our religious heritage from memory. Current legal doctrine, as we
will see, is on their side.
The title of this piece, hopefully, contains some shock value.
Subjecting the Declaration to constitutional analysis ought to draw
attention to the state of the contemporary establishment doctrine.
Perhaps, the natural conclusion of contemporary analysis will invoke
cause for serious reflection and reevaluation. In the 2004 flag pledge
case, Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,8 Justice Thomas
explained why the Court accepted the case:
We granted certiorari in this case to decide whether the Elk
Grove Unified School District’s Pledge policy violates the
Constitution. The answer to that question is: ‘no.’ But in a
testament to the condition of our Establishment Clause

8. 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring). Newdow was reversed on a standing
technicality, but three Justices (including Justice Thomas) reviewed the substantive issues,
concluding that the matter was properly before the Court.
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jurisprudence, the Court of Appeals reached the opposite
conclusion based on a persuasive reading of our precedent . . . .9

The Justice also observed that we have reached the point where
we now have “opportunity to begin the process of rethinking the
Establishment Clause.”10
After reviewing contemporary establishment doctrine, this
Article will apply its neutrality principle to the government’s religious
expression found in the Declaration. Following a final appraisal of
the doctrine of incorporation—noting that the Establishment Clause
became blurred only after incorporation—I conclude that the most
sensible recourse calls for the relinquishing of Everson usurpation
and the ousting of its doctrines.11
II
THE QUESTION OF THE RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE IN THE DECLARATION
Before cutting into the coppice of this Article, let us refresh our
minds with the potentially offensive and prohibited language of the
Declaration. The relevant provisions for juridical review are
contained throughout the document adopted by the Continental
Congress on July 4, 1776 to legally justify the break from the British
Crown. The question is whether the national declaration can survive
constitutional scrutiny when it is laced with and supported by
religious dogma and belief.
The following excerpts from the Declaration contain the relevant
language for analysis:

9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Establishment Clause
applies to the states, as well as to the federal government); see also discussion infra Parts V, VI.
The statement above will be developed in this Article. By “doctrines,” the author refers to
incorporation of the Establishment Clause and to government neutrality with religion.
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[T]he Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them [one
people], a decent Respect to the Opinions of Mankind requires
that they should declare the causes which impel them to the
Separation.
We hold these Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the
Pursuit of Happiness . . . .
WE, therefore, the Representatives of the UNITED STATES of
AMERICA, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the
Supreme Judge of the World for the Rectitude of our Intentions,
do . . . solemnly Publish and Declare, that these United Colonies
are, and of Right ought to be, FREE AND INDEPENDENT
STATES . . . .
And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance on
the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.12

III
THE CONTROLLING PRINCIPLE OF
CONTEMPORARY ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE INTERPRETATION
At the outset, observe how the Establishment Clause is written:
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”13 The second clause of free
exercise is included in the quotation because the clauses are
interdependently related and together compose one sentence of

12. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (U.S. 1776).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added). The original religion clause for the Bill of
Rights, as proposed by James Madison, sheds some light on the earliest intentions and scope of
the clause: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of religious belief or worship,
nor shall any national religion be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretence, infringed.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (June 8, 1789). “The
real object of the [Establishment Clause] was . . . to exclude all rivalry among Christian sects, and
to prevent any national ecclesiastical establishment, which should give to an hierarchy the
exclusive patronage of the national government.” 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 728 § 1871 (1833).
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thought. The Free Exercise Clause cannot have real meaning without
the proper operation of the preceding clause. That is, manipulation
of the words Congress, law and establishment will necessarily impact
the free exercise of religion and, for our purposes, may even prohibit
the free exercise of religion in the drafting of a government
declaration.
The road that leads from the plain language of the Establishment
Clause to the added language of the Supreme Court (in interpreting
the plain language) is bumpy and winding, indeed, and
Establishment Clause meaning and methodology continues to be
under construction. Concurring in Abington School District v.
Schempp, Justice Brennan professes the elusive goal of deciding
religion cases: “[T]he line we must draw between the permissible and
the impermissible is one which accords with history and faithfully
reflects the understanding of the Founding Fathers.”14 Nevertheless,
First Amendment establishment doctrine has become what it is.
Now that Congress no longer means Congress and law no longer
means law, several provisional tests15 for defining establishment are
set on the judicial table for individual consideration. If the relevant
religious expression fails just one test, it is ruled unconstitutional.
The initial notion that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the
First Amendment religion provisions began with Cantwell v.
Connecticut,16 and the Establishment Clause was turned on its head

14. 374 U.S. 203, 294 (1963).
15. See infra part III subsection B for a synopsis of the five tests currently used by the Court
to determine whether government has established religion. Of course, the inquiry involves any
level of federal and state government, including local townships and school districts. And the
government religious expression under review need not correlate to a duly enacted law, but
merely a non-written practice, policy or tradition.
16. 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). Embracing the Establishment Clause with the long arm of the
14th Amendment implies that state religious expression may be regulated by the federal courts.
When the Court says the 14th Amendment embraces, absorbs or incorporates a clause from the
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just seven years later in Everson v. Board of Education,17 when Justice
Black announced his six commandments that Congress and the
states and their municipalities shall not do.18
The second
commandment, seemingly pulled out of the midair clouds of Mount
Sinai, without supporting precedent, would lay the groundwork for
future Establishment Clause tests under the new concept of
government neutrality with religion. The neutrality rule, which
states that neither the federal nor state governments “can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over
another,”19 would become the Achilles’ Heel of all future attempts for
the Court to produce a systematic establishment doctrine with any
semblance of consistency and predictability. Indeed, the common
Bill of Rights, it categorically grants itself jurisdiction over the states. See infra section V for an
overview of the doctrine of incorporation.
17. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). Everson, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), was a dollars and cents establishment
case where the question was whether parents of parochial students could be reimbursed by the
state for bus fees in like manner as parents of public school students. The Court ruled that the
reimbursement law was constitutional and, therefore, reminiscent of its rulings in Cantwell, 310
U.S. 296 (1940), and Murdock, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), the Court came riding in to the local town to
protect free religious expression—armed with the First Amendment.
18. Justice Black’s commandments are as follows:
[1] Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. [2] Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
[3] Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church
against his will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. [4] No person
can be punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church
attendance or non-attendance. [5] No tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to
support any religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever
from they may adopt to teach or practice religion. [6] Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious
organizations or groups and vice versa.
Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 15–16. Some of the six rules make good historic sense in terms of limiting
the federal government via the Bill of Rights (the states have their own religious clauses and have
a constitutional right to self-government in the non-delegated area of religion). Respecting the
national Congress, rule one encapsulates the primary purpose of the Establishment Clause. Rule
two is patently false even applied solely to the federal government (as this Article will show, the
Declaration could not have been adopted under this test). Rules three and four are unquestionably
true. Rule five is true if it is referring to a positive tax and not tax exemption. And who can say
what rule six means?
19. Id. at 15.
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threads binding together the mass of confusion known as
establishment doctrine are the valiant efforts of the individual
Justices to uphold the concept of neutrality while simultaneously
making legal and historic sense.20 “The most lasting legacy of
Everson,” notes Donald Beschle, “would be the confident assertion
that government must maintain a strict neutrality, not merely among
religions, but between religion in general and irreligion.”21 We must
therefore remember that all subsequent tests invented and used by
the Court (to define establishment) are merely subsets and
expressions of the neutrality principle.
A. A Closer Look at Everson
In review of the landmark case of Everson v. Board of Education,22
let us examine the reasoning of Justice Black relating to federal
jurisdiction and the concept of government neutrality.
Initially, we will notice Justice Black’s cavalier rephrasing of the
religion clause in the Bill of Rights: “The First Amendment, as made
applicable to the states by the Fourteenth . . . commands that a state
‘shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.’”23 With a few strokes of the
pen, the Justice amended “Congress shall make no law” with an

20. The Court in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman,
403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971)), noted that “[t]he [Establishment] Clause erects a ‘blurred, indistinct,
and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular relationship.’” Everson
usurpation (incorporation) and neutrality necessarily produce judicial subjectivity and blurred
vision. Establishment jurisprudence is thus consistently inconsistent and predictably
unpredictable.
21. Donald L. Beschle, Does the Establishment Clause Matter? Non-Establishment Principles
in the United States and Canada, 4 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 451, 456 (2002).
22. 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
23. Id. at 8 (citation omitted) (emphasis added). One can only imagine the level of anguish
Jefferson or Madison would suffer at the sight of those words after laboring to add language to
protect the states from the federal government.
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editorial note in the margin of the Constitution: “Add local school
district here.” It was one small step for the Court, but one giant leap
for the nation. Next, the Justice is so bold as to pretend that his
inverted statement above contains the words of the actual clause:
“These words of the First Amendment reflected in the minds of early
Americans a vivid mental picture of conditions and practices which
they fervently wished to stamp out . . . .”24 He continues, by stating
that, “[d]oubtless their goal has not been entirely reached . . . .”25
Therefore, the Supreme Court in 1947 is prepared to establish
precedent in a brash effort to help those early Americans reach the
Court’s ill-advised perception of their goal.
Notwithstanding Justice Black’s dramatic historical narrative and
grandiose goal, one of the major problems for the Court regarding
the “evils, fears, and political problems that caused that expression to
be written into our Bill of Rights,”26 is that no historic scholarship
maintains that the Bill of Rights was written for any reason other
than to control the power of the federal government. No one can
argue that the Court’s rewriting of the Establishment Clause
presently “commands that a state”27 does or refrains from doing what
the Court says. But, the preeminent question asks whether the Court
had the authority to rewrite the Bill of Rights in the first place.
Indeed, as stated by Justice Marshall in 1833, contrary to what Justice
Black asserts, the “serious fears” the early Americans entertained
were that federal power might be “exercised in a manner dangerous

24.
25.
26.
27.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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to liberty.”28 Moreover, “[the Bill of Rights] demanded security
against the apprehended encroachments of the general [federal]
government—not against those of the local governments.”29 Closing
the door on ambiguity, Justice Marshall concludes that, “[t]hese
amendments contain no expression indicating an intention to apply
them to the state governments.”30
In the later Everson opinion, approximately eight paragraphs and
1,799 words separate Justice Black’s above rephrasing of the religion
clause from his infamous use of Thomas Jefferson’s wall of separation
statement. A casual reader cannot help but notice that, setting
personal opinion and drama aside, the Court relies upon no direct
precedent to support its very specific statements of newly-formulated
establishment doctrine.
What the Court does cite neither supports its alleged right to
unilaterally amend the Constitution nor its new doctrine of state
(and federal) neutrality with religion. Instead, the Court cites an act
of the Virginia Assembly known as the Virginia Bill for Religious
Liberty, which was, like the Declaration, written in large part by

28. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 250 (1833). The Court also states: “In
compliance with a sentiment thus generally expressed, to quiet fears thus extensively entertained,
amendments were proposed by the required majority in congress, and adopted by the states.” Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. Additionally,
[i]f the original constitution, in the ninth and tenth sections of the first article, draws
this plain and marked line of discrimination between the limitations it imposes on the
powers of the general government, and on those of the states; if, in every inhibition
intended to act on state power, words are employed which directly express that intent;
some strong reason must be assigned for departing from this safe and judicious course
in framing the amendments, before that departure can be assumed. We search in vain
for that reason. Had the people of the several states, or any of them, required changes in
their constitutions; had they required additional safe-guards to liberty from the
apprehended encroachments of their particular governments: the remedy was in their
own hands, and would have been applied by themselves.
Id. at 249.
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Thomas Jefferson. The Court quotes part of the preamble of that bill
as follows:
Almighty God hath created the mind free; that all attempts to
influence it by temporal punishments or burthens, or by civil
incapacitations, tend only to beget habits of hypocrisy and
meanness, and are a departure from the plan of the Holy author
of our religion, who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose
not to propagate it by coercions on either . . . ; that to compel a
man to furnish contributions of money for the propagation of
opinions which he disbelieves, is sinful and tyrannical; that even
the forcing him to support this or that teacher of his own
religious persuasion, is depriving him of the comfortable liberty
of giving his contributions to the particular pastor, whose morals
he would make his pattern . . . .31

The fact that the states are quite capable of enacting their own
bills of religious rights lends little to support the Court’s conclusion
that the Establishment Clause in the Bill of Rights of the United
States Constitution was meant to be anything other than a safeguard
from federal power in matters of the states’ free exercise of religion.
In the quote above, take note of the phrase, “The Holy author of
our religion who being Lord both of body and mind, yet chose not to
propagate it by coercions.” That is quite a statement. To whom
might Virginia be referring to as “Lord?” Those words do not exactly
support the contemporary concept of state neutrality with religion.
Also, I invite the reader to reexamine the mini-phrase within the
phrase: “Our religion.” The fact that we find reference to Virginia’s
general, non-mandated religion in the bosom of the foremost
document guaranteeing religious freedom and forbidding coercive
action of the state ought to say something about the state’s right of
preferring its founding religion over others.32

31. Everson v. Bd. of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1947)
32. In 1833, Joseph Story stated the following:
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After quoting the Virginia law, the Court in Everson then, in
either ignorance or arrogance, says, “[t]his Court has previously
recognized that the provisions of the First Amendment, in the
drafting and adoption of which Madison and Jefferson played such
leading roles, had the same objective and were intended to provide
the same protection against governmental intrusion on religious
liberty as the Virginia statute.”33 Of course, one of the minor details
Justice Black omits is that the objective of the First Amendment was
to safeguard the states from the federal government.34 If Justice
Black’s reasoning is correct then Virginia must surrender the very
religious rights and expression overtly contained in its own bill—
which the Court amazingly cites to justify its usurpation.
Finally, we get to Justice Black’s misplaced use of Jefferson’s wall
of separation statement, with supporting citation to Reynolds v.
United States (1878).35 Another glittering problem for the Everson
Court is that Reynolds uses Jefferson’s phrase in sound historic and
legal context (and, of course, Everson, does not). In Reynolds, the
Court acknowledges the wall keeping the federal government out of
state religion, but holds that no wall exists with respect to the federal

Probably at the time of the adoption of the constitution, and of the [First Amendment],
now under consideration, the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was,
that Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far as was not
incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and the freedom of religious
worship. An attempt to level all religions, and to make it a matter of state policy to hold
all in utter indifference, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal
indignation.
3 STORY, supra note 13, at § 1868.
33. Everson, 330 U.S. at 13 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878));
Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872); Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 342 (1890)). None
of the cases cited even remotely support the Court’s position in Everson.
34. See supra notes 13, 28–30.
35. Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citing Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164).
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Congress enacting criminal laws for the pre-state territories, even if
such laws conflict with practice motivated by religious belief.
The following is from Reynolds, where the Court quotes Jefferson
and applies the Jeffersonian remark to its ruling:
Mr. Jefferson afterwards, in reply to an address to him by a
committee of the Danbury Baptist Association, took occasion to
say: “Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other
for his faith or his worship; that the legislative powers of the
government reach actions only, and not opinions—I contemplate
with sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people
which declared that their legislature should ‘make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof,’ thus building a wall of separation between
church and State. Adhering to this expression of the supreme will
of the nation in behalf of the rights of conscience, I shall see with
sincere satisfaction the progress of those sentiments which tend
to restore man to all his natural rights, convinced he has no
natural right in opposition to his social duties.” Coming as this
does from an acknowledged leader of the advocates of the
measure, it may be accepted almost as an authoritative
declaration of the scope and effect of the amendment thus
secured. Congress was deprived of all legislative power over mere
opinion, but was left free to reach actions which were in violation
of social duties or subversive of good order.36

Jefferson wrote to the Baptist Association on January 1, 1802,
during his presidency, in response to the Association’s inquiry
regarding federal power and the church.37 In his reply, he addressed
the short reach of the federal government’s power with respect to the
church by quoting the religion clause of the First Amendment—
followed with the infamous words, “thus building a wall of separation

36. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164 (internal citations omitted).
37. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to the Danbury Baptist Ass’n (Jan. 1, 1802) in 16
WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, supra note 3, at 281–82.
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between church and state.”38 In context of Jefferson’s letter, the
legislature of the whole American people (Congress) runs directly
into a brick wall in any attempt to dictate the church’s opinions and
beliefs.
The use of Jefferson’s phrase was in perfect context for the issue
before the Court in Reynolds. For in Reynolds, the Court ruled that
Congressional power does in fact reach actions regardless of religious
belief—if the actions are criminal. So, while a high wall keeps
Congress out of state religious matters, there is not so much as a
picket fence when it comes to criminal behavior. “Congress was
deprived of all legislative power over mere opinion,” writes Justice
Waite, “but was left free to reach actions which were in violation of
social duties or subversive of good order.”39
Justice Waite, in Reynolds, viewed the wall keeping the federal
government out of local religious affairs with high esteem, using
Jefferson’s letter to support a commonsense exception. Justice Black,
in Everson, on the contrary, tore down the wall raised by the Bill of
Rights, allowing the federal courts to ransack the sacred cities. And
using Jefferson’s words out of context, he erected his own artificial
wall, which has been used ever since to command government
neutrality and separation of public religious expression from the
states and their localities.
Thereafter, by following the precedent handed down in Everson,
the Supreme Court would go on to build an entire body of
establishment doctrine upon a foundation of sinking sand.

38. Id.
39. Reynolds, 98 U.S. at 164.
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B. Lemon and Beyond
The overarching principle of neutrality was eventually formulated
into a three-prong analysis in the case of Lemon v. Kurtzman.40
Drawing, inter alia, from Board of Education v. Allen,41 and Walz v.
Tax Commission,42 the Court spelled out the structure of its scrutiny.
“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; second, its
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion; finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive
government entanglement with religion.’”43 If the relevant statute
(and presently, language, symbol or practice) fails any of the three
tests, it is deemed to be unconstitutional and hence, illegal.44
When Justice O’Connor advanced the endorsement test in the
case of Lynch v. Donnelly45 in 1984, we must not forget that she also
was under the influence of the alluring drink of neutrality. In the
words of the Justice, “[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to a religion relevant in any way
to a person’s standing in the political community.”46 Under the test,
the state violates the proscription of making religious adherence
relevant by either excessive entanglement or “government
endorsement or disapproval of religion.”47 The endorsement test as
proposed is really a two-prong entanglement/endorsement test, but
in keeping with custom, this Article will employ a separate

40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968).
397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612–13 (emphasis added) (quoting Walz, 397 U.S. at 674).
Id.
465 U.S. 668, 687–95 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
Id. at 687 (emphasis added).
Id. at 687–88.
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endorsement subheading. The prohibitive message that government
endorsement purportedly sends to “nonadherents [is] that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and
[endorsement sends] an accompanying message to adherents that
they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”48
The coercion test finds its modern antecedents in McCollum v.
Board of Education,49 where we find reference to indirect or subtle
coercion “through use of the State’s compulsory public school
machinery.”50 By the time the coercion test was articulated in Lee v.
Weisman,51 the indirect-coercion-by-coercive-atmosphere doctrine
had been fairly developed in pre-Lemon school district cases
involving prayer and Bible reading in the early 1960s.52
The five tests above are not all applied by every Supreme Court
Justice in every establishment question case.53 The Court has
“repeatedly emphasized [its] unwillingness to be confined to any
single test or criterion in this sensitive area.”54 Inasmuch as they are

48. Id. at 688 (citing Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963)).
49. 333 U.S. 203, 217 (1948).
50. Id. at 212, 217.
51. 505 U.S. 577 592–99 (1992). See Newdow v. U.S. Cong., 292 F.3d 597, 605 (9th Cir.
2002) (insisting that the coercion test is said to have been “first used by the Court in Lee”).
52. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (school prayer); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963) (Bible reading).
53. Often, when the Court wants to uphold a government religious expression, neutrality
principles are simply set aside. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 125 S. Ct. 2854, 2861 (2005)
(referring to a granite monument standing six-feet tall by three-feet wide and bearing the Ten
Commandments, the Court noted, “[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger
scheme of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, we think it not useful in dealing with the sort of
passive monument that Texas has erected on its Capitol grounds. Instead, our analysis is driven
both by the nature of the monument and by our Nation’s history”). For another example see
Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), where, interestingly, Chief Justice Burger, who had
gleaned and articulated the three neutrality elements in Lemon, refused to apply any of them in
his Marsh opinion. Incidentally, Marsh involved a Presbyterian minister paid with state funds to
serve as a legislative chaplain.
54. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984).
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ladled out of the same pot of neutrality, the tests are often mixed and
matched and are used differently by different Justices. For example,
as was noted above, Justice O’Connor relied upon only the
entanglement and endorsement tests to fashion her concurring
opinion in Lynch.55 Nevertheless, in an attempt to leave no
touchstone unturned, this Article will consider each of the five tests.
IV
THE DECLARATION AND CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS
A. Secular Legislative Purpose
We must note first that the legislative part of purpose is presently
a misnomer. The entire concept and requirement of Congress
passing a law has been eliminated as an unnecessary inquiry in
contemporary establishment jurisprudence. We are only concerned
with whether the Declaration has an actual secular purpose.56
We will examine the religious nature of the Declaration under
subsequent subheadings, but for now we are in search of a genuine
secular motivation. With that being the case, we may pass through
this subsection rather quickly concluding that the Declaration, of
course, has a secular purpose. Though we may easily discern men
acknowledging, appealing to, relying upon and exalting the Supreme
Judge of the world in the document, no tenable argument can be
made that the Declaration was written for ecclesiastical or religious
purposes—devoid of secular purpose. The Declaration is an
instrument of legal interposition, and its primary purpose was to
formally lay out the reasons and justifications for declaring

55. Id. at 687–94.
56. Of course, with the present inquiry, the Declaration is the act of a federal legislative body
and carries the full force of law.
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independence from Great Britain.57 As such, the Declaration clearly
passes the secular purpose part of the Lemon test.
B. Primary Effect of Advancing or Prohibiting Religion
Prior to considering the hallmarks of the effect test, let us consider
the context of the public’s contact with the text of the Declaration.
Most often people are introduced to the phraseology as students
either in public or private school settings. The teaching of certain
academic disciplines requires examination, if only at some bare level,
of the text of one of our most momentous founding documents.
Even at minimum exposure, the reader will encounter religious
words capable of offending sensibilities—words the reader might
find offensive, repulsive and in direct opposition to one’s faith or
belief.
Indeed, in the very first sentence of the Declaration we encounter
the word “God.”58
In the subsequent sentence we find codified religious doctrines of
presupposition and belief. The religious doctrine of the Declaration’s
second sentence may be construed as nothing less than six articles of
religious faith: “We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men
are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain
unalienable Rights . . . .”59 First, we find an absolutist view of truth.
Second, we see a proposition of religious epistemology. Third, we
cannot escape the religious doctrine of creation. Fourth, a moral
pronouncement of equality is based solely upon religion. Fifth, we
encounter the bold religious tenet that the Creator has gifted the
reader with unalienable Rights. And, sixth, we see the religious
57. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
58. Id. para 1.
59. Id. para 2.

H 306 I

05__KULIGOWSKI.DOC

VOL. 2

11/1/2007 3:56:30 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
& PUBLIC POLICY

2007

position that, if the rights are unalienable, the Creator has a higher
authority than the state.
“The purpose prong of the Lemon test asks whether
government’s actual purpose is to endorse or disapprove of
religion.”60 We have noted that the Declaration easily passes that
test. However, “[t]he effect prong asks whether, irrespective of
government’s actual purpose, the practice under review in fact
conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval. An affirmative
answer to either question should render the challenged practice
invalid.”61
The effect prong relating to the advancement of religion has been
defined and characterized by the idea of government endorsement of
religion, which means the two tests overlap, with the former perhaps
being integrated into the latter.
The Court in Allegheny noted that,
[o]ur subsequent decisions further have refined the definition of
governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion. In
recent years, we have paid particularly close attention to whether
the challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or
effect of ‘endorsing’ religion, a concern that has long had a place
in our Establishment Clause jurisprudence.62

We should not be surprised that “the word ‘endorsement’ is not
self-defining. Rather, it derives its meaning from other words that
this Court has found useful over the years in interpreting the
Establishment Clause.”63 To help us understand, Justice Blackmun
explains that government may not “‘convey a message that religion

60. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
61. Id.
62. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 592 (1989) (citing Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S.
421, 436 (1962)).
63. Id. at 593.
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or a particular religious belief is favored or preferred.’”64
Additionally, neither the Congress nor the township may “‘favor
religious belief over disbelief.’”65 Neither may the government adopt
a “‘preference for the dissemination of religious ideas.’”66 The Justice
also mentions Lynch to remind us that the word “endorsement is
closely linked to the term promotion.”67 Epperson v. Arkansas is
quoted for the long standing rule that “government ‘may not . . .
promote one religion or religious theory against another . . . .’”68
Finally, the Justice concludes by noting that the Court in Wallace,
uses the “concepts of endorsement, promotion, and favoritism
interchangeably.”69
So how does Justice Blackmun tie it all together with respect to
the question of whether the government’s actions have the primary
effect of advancing religion? “Whether the key word is
‘endorsement,’ ‘favoritism,’ or ‘promotion,’ the essential principle
remains the same. The Establishment Clause, at the very least,
prohibits government from appearing to take a position on questions
of religious belief . . . .”70
One may abandon all hope of making sense of the Court’s
reasoning and nevertheless conclude that the Declaration is in
serious constitutional trouble under part two of the Lemon analysis.
The problem any government religious expression encounters is that

64. Id. (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 70 (1985)).
65. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring) (quoting Tex. Monthly v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 27–28
(1989)).
66. Id.
67. Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 593 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465
U.S. 668, 691 (1984)).
68. Id. (quoting Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968)).
69. Id. (citing Wallace, 472 U.S. at 59–60).
70. Id. at 593–94.
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the more terms (which are not self-defining) the Court adds to its
lexicon of Establishment Clause interpretive theory, the greater the
odds of the relevant expression failing constitutional muster. After
all, the relevant government religious practice or expression will fall
if it does not measure up to just one Court-defined term. Just from
the brief recital of Justice Blackmun, above, the Declaration
encounters a fleet of contact mines that it must successfully navigate
to earn the neutrality stamp of the Supreme Court.
It is sensible to start with what the Establishment Clause prohibits
at the very least: if appearing to take a position on questions of
religious belief is a violation, then the government via the
Declaration collides head-on with the effect test. In the Declaration,
the government does far more than appearing to take a position. The
government articulates its own religious beliefs, leaving no question
as to its position.
One of the many subtests of the test as articulated by the Court in
Wallace v. Jaffree is that the government is precluded “from
conveying or attempting to convey a message that religion or a
particular religious belief is favored or preferred.”71 In Wallace, the
state legislature attempted to convey a message that prayer was
favored over non-prayer meditation. The issue before the Court was
the constitutionality of three state statutes which authorized a daily,
one-minute period of silence in the public schools for meditation;
meditation or voluntary prayer; and for willing students, a prescribed
prayer to Almighty God, the Creator and Supreme Judge of the
world.72

71. 472 U.S. at 70 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
72. Id. at 40. The statutes were enacted in 1978, 1981, and 1982, respectively. Id.
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In consideration of the legislative history and the plain
progression of the statutes toward favoring prayer, Justice Stevens,
writing for the Court, concluded that “the Alabama Legislature
intended to change existing law and that it was motivated . . . [by the]
sole purpose of expressing the State’s endorsement of prayer
activities for one minute at the beginning of each schoolday [sic].”73
Moreover, the Court noted that the “addition of ‘or voluntary prayer’
indicates that the State intended to characterize prayer as a favored
practice. Such an endorsement is not consistent with the established
principle that the government must pursue a course of complete
neutrality toward religion.”74 The established principle as succinctly
articulated by Justice Stevens encapsulates the Court’s contemporary
neutrality doctrine in one sentence.
The state legislators, above, may have intended to favor and
endorse prayer and, thus, depart from the Court’s mandate of
complete neutrality, but, in doing so they were following suit of
certain federal legislators before them. The government, speaking for
all the people (in the Declaration), is found appealing to the Supreme
Judge of the world with a specific petition for approval of their
intentions and protection of their very lives. The voluntary prayer
authorized by the state of Alabama was to the same “Supreme Judge
of the world,”75 yet, interestingly, there is neither citation nor
reference to the Declaration in the Wallace opinion.
Concurring in Abington School District v. Schempp, Justice
Goldberg boldly states that, “[t]he fullest realization of true religious
liberty requires that government . . . effect no favoritism among sects

73. Id. at 60.
74. Id. (emphasis added).
75. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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or between religion and nonreligion, and that it work deterrence of
no religious belief.”76 Certainly, an atheist is likely to view the
relevant religious language in the Declaration as a disapproval of his
religious choice, while a monotheist is likely to exclaim, “Amen.” In
shocking contrast to neutrality precedent, the government made no
provision to accommodate those who reject the religious doctrine of
the Declaration. We do not find one clause that says, “We hold these
Truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created equal, that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights,”
countered by another which says, “Of course, some of us do not hold
those propositions as truths and, therefore, base the right for freedom
not upon god-given rights, but upon wide-ranging conceptions of
mankind’s inherent right of self realization, autonomous from the
restraints of conventional belief in a creator or a god.”
The Court in Texas Monthly v. Bullock, admonishes the Lone Star
State, as follows: “[B]y confining the tax exemption exclusively to the
sale of religious publications, Texas engaged in preferential support
for the communication of religious messages.”77 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun insists that, “[a] statutory preference for the dissemination
of religious ideas offends our most basic understanding of what the
Establishment Clause is all about and hence is constitutionally
intolerable.”78
The Declaration’s message, of course, was meant to be
disseminated—along with its well-articulated religious ideas and
theories, which are endorsed, favored and promoted by the
government in its dissemination.

76. 374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
77. 489 U.S. 1, 28 (1989) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
78. Id.
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In wrapping this inquiry up, we must ask the following rhetorical
question: Though the Declaration was written to achieve a secular
purpose, does it nevertheless have the primary effect of either
advancing or prohibiting religion?79 Arguably, the original, primary
effect of the Declaration was to instill nationalism and patriotism; but
even then, the government used religion to do so. The government
conveyed a message of endorsing one particular religious belief while
remaining conspicuously silent regarding other beliefs and nonreligious beliefs.
Of course, the Revolutionary War has long been over. When
contemporary non-adherents are made to encounter religious
language they find utterly offensive, it becomes difficult to imagine
the document having any effect other than advancing a repugnant
religion upon the conscience of the objecting reader.
If the Declaration fails one test, it falls short of the Court’s
standard; but to perceive just how far it falls, let us go on to consider
how the document is and is not written in light of the contemporary
doctrine of entanglement.
C. Excessive Government Entanglement with Religion
Instrumental in positing a declaration of independence against a
kingdom whose king is defined in the document as a “tyrant,” is
stating the sure basis for doing so. The excitement of fight or flight
was in the revolutionary air in 1776, and the unified sentiment was
fight until freedom was secured. As soon as the ink of ratification
had dried, flight was not an option.80 Prepared for full-scale war, and
79. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (articulating and applying this
three-pronged test).
80. Although historians credit the start of the Revolutionary War with the battles of
Lexington and Concord on April 19, 1775, the Lee Resolution of July 2, 1776 and the Declaration
solidified the inescapable course of either full national victory or defeat.
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great risk of loss of life, the men of the Continental Congress looked
to the surest possible foundation to support their intentions. Never
was there witnessed a more solemn time of deliberation over the
future of a nation than when those men, sensible of danger and
incalculable loss, looked to their Creator for the Rights they were
claiming. They believed the cause was just, noble and right because
the cause found sanction from a Lawgiver higher than the state.
Indeed, the adopters of the Declaration appealed to the Supreme
Judge of the World for the “rectitude,” that is, the righteousness, of
their intentions. And, mindful of their frailty, they relied upon the
protection of Divine Providence.
The American founders believed that certain higher laws entitle
nations to govern themselves independently from rule that is
contrary to this authority. That idea is so fundamental that it is a
matter of natural law.81 Of course, the laws of nature are subject to
their Creator; and it is to the Supreme Deity that people must also
subject themselves in order to avail themselves of the rights, blessings
and responsibilities associated with the operation of higher law.
Observe that the Declaration is not content to stop with finite
nature. To stop there is to have no authority higher than the state.
To stop there is to have nothing beyond the mind of man. The

81. William Blackstone said that the “will of [the] maker is called the law of nature.” 1
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND § 2 (1765). Another influence
was John Locke:
“The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges every one: and
reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind . . . that being all equal and independent,
no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions: for men being all
the workmanship of one omnipotent and infinitely wise maker; all the servants of one
sovereign master, sent into the world by his order . . . ”
2 JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT § 6 (1772); Charles Montesquieu added that,
“The law which, impressing on our minds the idea of a Creator, inclines us towards Him, is the
first in importance, though not in order, of natural laws.” 1 BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF LAWS § 2 (Thomas Nugent trans.) (1873).
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American founders did not say that Nature and their brilliant
reasoning entitled them to self-government, but rather the Laws of
Nature and of Nature’s God entitled them. The founders did not
grant themselves their rights; they received them from God. They
did not create our fundamental rights; they applied them. They did
not look to the state. Rather, they looked to God.
A naturalistic, secular world-view has no place in the Declaration.
Within the four corners of the great document, man does not exist as
the result of impersonal, cold, dead matter mysteriously coming
alive, self-creating, breathing and thinking. Man is not part of the
machine living in a closed system.82 On the contrary, the finite has
an infinite reference point found only in his Creator. All men were
created equal says the Declaration, which is another way of saying all
men were created in the image of God. Not only did the Creator
endow men with breath, but also with unalienable rights—rights that
cannot lawfully be taken away by the state. So far, we see that the
Declaration is anything but a secular or religiously neutral document.
When the Founding Fathers, via the Declaration, appealed to the
Supreme Judge of the World for the rectitude to support the grand
plan of independence, they were not appealing to one of many
sources. They cited no international court rulings. Instead, they
took their petition directly to the High Court of heaven and earth.
No king had the authority to sanction what they were after; only the
King of kings could bless and approve their endeavor. The
Declaration does not look to man for validation, but to God alone.
The document does not rely upon human rights, but upon the God
who endows men with unalienable rights. The Declaration does not

82. The concept of the naturalistic man’s view of himself as being part of the machine in a
closed system is borrowed from FRANCIS A. SCHAEFFER, HE IS THERE AND HE IS NOT SILENT 42–
48 (1972).
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say that some of the founders appealed to their own reason, others to
the secular state, others to the Tao, others to political theory, and still
others to the general good of mankind.
The document is profoundly interwoven with one monotheistic
religion, and in the postlude of the Declaration, we find a statement
of entanglement with this particular religion that equates to nothing
less than dependence upon the God of the Declaration. The future of
North America as united and free states depends entirely upon this
clause: “And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm Reliance
on the Protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each
other our Lives, our Fortunes, and our sacred Honor.”83 Notice that
the patriots pledged to each other their very lives; but also notice that
there was a condition antecedent. They did not pledge their lives
until they had pledged themselves to the God who was actually able
to protect and keep them. That was not ceremonial religious
language; that was religious language in the context of life and death.
Here, we do not see a faint, superfluous acknowledgment of religion.
On the contrary, we see a firm reliance on the protection of Divine
Providence. Indeed, 230 years later, we can still feel the intensity of
the religious conviction captured on the aging tablet.
We thus find within the Declaration nothing less than a solemn
prayer to the Creator and Supreme Judge of the world—a Judge who
sees, hears and intervenes for those who trust in Him. Every
religious prayer is an appeal to some conceptual deity; in this
important document of interposition, we find the government
appealing to a very specific Deity, indeed.
The God of the Declaration is notably large, powerful and
authoritative. As the Creator of man, He is the very source of life and

83. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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liberty. And this God is the substantive source of right and wrong
(hence, the supplication to the Supreme Judge for the rectitude of
their intentions).
The document’s language casts aside the
contemporary definition of deism. The God of the Declaration is
personal, able, and apparently willing to watch over and protect
individuals and the nation at large. Having one eye on the
parchment and the other looking ahead to the contest with Great
Britain, we must conclude that the men of the Continental Congress
in fact believed that this God could, and would, protect the nation as
they placed themselves under His mighty hand of providence. When
considering the specific titles used for the God of the Declaration,
together with His attributes, we must conclude that the American
forefathers placed their trust firmly in none other than God
Almighty.
There scarcely could have been a greater instance of excessive
entanglement between the state and religion as we find bound
together by the iron pen of the Declaration.84
The problem for the Declaration, of course, is that the Supreme
Court’s doctrine of excessive entanglement renders our preeminent
document illegal as written. In the political context of the
Declaration, Chief Justice Burger explains that “a broader base of
entanglement” inquiry involves the question of whether the relevant
government expression carries the “potential” for political
divisiveness based upon religion.85 Citing a law journal Comment to
support its proposition, the Court continues: “Ordinarily political
debate and division, however vigorous or even partisan, are normal
and healthy manifestations of our democratic system of government,
84. NATIONAL TREASURE (Walt Disney Pictures 2004) (using the “iron pen” to refer to the
strength and resolve with which the Declaration was written).
85. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 622 (1971).
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but political division along religious lines was one of the principal
evils against which the First Amendment was intended to protect.”86
That statement should be axiomatic because the “history of many
countries attests to the hazards of religion’s intruding into the
political arena or of political power intruding into the legitimate and
free exercise of religious belief.”87
The act of government officials wrapping themselves in religious
doctrine in support of the Declaration necessarily places its readers
in the tenuous position of accepting or rejecting their country’s
religious dogma. The Declaration carries the potential for political
divisiveness inasmuch as non-adherents might be made to feel less
patriotic than adherents.
D. Government Endorsement of Religion
The last thought of the previous subsection creates a natural
transition into our next test of endorsement. In fact, Justice
O’Conner likely developed her political outsider conceptualization
from, inter alia, the Lemon principle. We have already seen that the
effect test has been somewhat subsumed by the endorsement test.
We may also follow the ruminations over “political divisiveness”
from the entanglement test to their current form as expressed in the
endorsement test.
With that being the case, this subsection will focus on how the
Declaration might make “adherence to a religion relevant . . . to a
person’s standing in the political community.”88 That is, whether the

86. Id. Not so ironically, the Court’s misconception of the “evils” the First Amendment was
intended to protect against are strikingly similar to those arguments first advanced by Justice
Black in Everson v. Board of Education. 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (holding that the Establishment Clause
applies to the states, as well as to the federal government).
87. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 623.
88. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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government’s endorsement of religion via the Declaration sends a
“prohibitive message” to non-adherents that “they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the
political community.”89
Well, it is difficult to imagine how government could make
adherence to religion more relevant than by basing the future of the
entire nation upon the power of its God to endorse and watch over
the cause of freedom. We may mark the operation of reciprocal
endorsement: God is endorsing the government, and the government
is endorsing the religion of the wise Creator.
When the government speaks for everyone, applying the plural
pronoun, “we,” (as in “We hold these truths to be self-evident”)90
relevance certainly attaches. Everyone is dragged in and is presumed
to hold the religious propositions that follow. That kind of
homogeneous religious thinking, of course, runs amuck of what the
Supreme Court says the Constitution says.
In County of Allegheny v. ACLU,91 the Court considered the
constitutionality of a Christmastime nativity scene (crèche) displayed
on city property that included an angel bearing a banner
proclaiming, “Gloria in Excelsis Deo!”92 Writing for the majority,
Justice Blackmun concludes: “The government may acknowledge
Christmas as a cultural phenomenon, but under the First
Amendment it may not observe it as a Christian holy day by
suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus.”93

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id. at 688.
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
492 U.S. 573 (1989).
Id. at 580.
Id. at 601.
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That is an interesting and far-reaching conclusion, but it must be
followed if contemporary doctrine is to be applied to the Declaration.
Justice Blackmun suggests that by displaying the crèche, the City of
Pittsburgh was “suggesting that people praise God for the birth of
Jesus.”94 The angel’s statement, which is part of the history of the
birth of Christ, was displayed in Latin. The Declaration, on the
contrary, is written in English. If we must conclude that Pittsburgh
was suggesting that people praise God for the birth of Jesus from the
angel’s Latin banner which is translated, “Glory to God in the
Highest,” then we have yet another neutrality problem for the
Declaration. How do we not conclude that the government was
suggesting that people should believe they were created by God and
endowed with certain unalienable rights? If you read Latin and
understand that because the angel was giving glory to God, it is
imputed that you also understand that the City of Pittsburgh is
suggesting that you, like the angel, give glory to God. Applying that
reasoning to the Declaration, when you read of the founders
appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world, it is imputed that you
understand that the government is suggesting that you, like they, also
appeal to the Supreme Judge of the world.
The Court uses the nebulous “reasonable observer” to determine
government endorsement and outsider status. In the nativity context
above, the Court observed that a reasonable observer would conclude
that government was endorsing religion.95 The “reasonable observer”
is presumed to be “aware of the history and context of the
community and forum in which the religious display appears.”96 By
imputing to our reasonable observer the history and context of the
94. Id. at 620.
95. Id.
96. Capitol Square Review v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 780 (1995) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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Declaration, one must ask whether such an observer would view the
religious language as merely ceremonial or as a substantive
expression of faith. Does the religious language contain enough
substance that our non-adhering observer would view the religious
language as a disapproval of her particular religious choices?
Would a non-adherent be made to feel that she is not part of the
“We,” in “We hold these truths . . . ?”97 Is the atheist less worthy of
the enumerated rights? Is the non-believer a lesser member of the
political community? Certainly, the political force of the Declaration
surpasses that of a nativity scene. If a community’s seasonal
placement of a nativity scene causes individuals to feel as though they
are political outsiders, how much more will non-adherents feel like
outsiders who reject the enduring religious principles on which the
Declaration rests?
E. Government Coercion
“It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the Constitution
guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which
‘establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’”98
The dual clinchers of that sentence from Lee v. Weisman are “or
otherwise act” and “or tends to do so.”99 So how might the
government coerce or otherwise act or otherwise tend to do so?
The contemporary Court, of course, is not looking for actual
coercion or even actual establishment, for that matter, but for any

97. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
98. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678
(1984)); see also County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989) (quoting Everson v. Bd.
of Ed., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947)).
99. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
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violation of the complete neutrality principle. In the Lee case, which
has become known for its coercion test articulation, the question was
whether the First Amendment prohibits local public school officials
from inviting clergy members to offer invocations and benedictions
at graduation ceremonies.100 The nonsectarian prayers at issue were
offered by a local Jewish rabbi and contained the word “God” twice—
once in the invocation and once in the benediction.101 The word
“Lord” was also used once in the benediction. God was thanked for
the “legacy of America,” for endowing the students with the “capacity
for learning,” and for “keeping us alive, sustaining us, and allowing
us to reach this special, happy occasion.”102 Rabbi Gutterman also
asked for the blessings of God upon the teachers and administrators
and for “strength and guidance” for the graduates.103
Subtle and indirect pressure to participate in religious expression
“can be as real as any overt compulsion,” says Justice Kennedy,
armed with the latest “research in psychology.”104 The question of
whether the Court should be determining and quantifying student
psychological peer pressure is beyond the reach of this Article, but
within its reach are the implications of the following statement of the
Court: “But for the dissenter of high school age, who has a reasonable
perception that she is being forced by the State to pray in a manner
her conscience will not allow, the injury is no less real [than overt
compulsion].”105

100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

Id. at 581.
Id. at 581–83.
Id.
Id. at 581–82.
Id. at 593–94.
Id. at 593.
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That, unfortunately for the Declaration, is the precedent we must
apply to our analysis. The Court establishes precedent allowing a
student’s perception that she is being forced to pray at a graduation
ceremony to be classified as a “reasonable perception.”106 As we
review the Court-defined coercive atmosphere of the graduation
ceremony, we find only that the audience was asked to stand for the
“two minutes or so” of invocation and benediction.107 The dissenting
student was not forced to stand, nor make any gesture nor pray nor
utter any word.108
Similar to the reasoning in Allegheny, where a reasonable
observer would interpret the city as suggesting that she praise God
because of the crèche,109 here, the reasonable dissenter interprets the
school district as forcing her to pray because of the rabbi’s
invocation.110 Even though she is not actually praying (and may even
be loathing the rabbi’s prayer in the silent dissent of her mind), the
Court holds that she has the reasonable perception that she is in fact
being forced by the state to pray.111
Inasmuch as the dissenter perceives she is being forced to pray,
the Court also perceives that she sustains injury by virtually praying;
and her injuries are no less real than if she had been forced by the
state to actually deliver Rabbi Gutterman’s nonsectarian prayer. “The
injury caused by the government’s action . . . is that the State, in a
school setting, in effect required participation in a religious

106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 594.
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 620 (1989).
Lee, 505 U.S. at 593.
Id.
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exercise.”112 The Court uses the terms “offense, embarrassment and
intrusion” to define the dissenter’s injuries.113
The coercion test becomes applicable when the federal
government’s (or the local community’s) free exercise of religion
creates an indirect, subtle, yet psychologically coercive atmosphere
for objectors. In the Declaration, we observe the free exercise and
expression of religion by the government itself, not a clergy member.
The mere fact that students have little choice but to encounter the
religious language of the Declaration is enough to create an
atmosphere of psychological coercion wherein dissenters may
reasonably feel that the government is forcing them to believe the
religious doctrine contained therein.
Contemporary coercion doctrine is violated when an individual is
psychologically injured by offensive, embarrassing and intrusive
religious expression that is diverse from her particular religious
beliefs and choices. Unfortunately, for the rest of the community—
because of psychological peer pressure—she is unable to endure the
free exercise of religion without colorable offense.
F. The Naivety of Neutrality
The Declaration finds no support from four of the above tests of
the Court because the entire paradigm of government neutrality with
religion is wrought with frailty. Neutrality is an impossible task,
especially at the place the Court has labored most fervently—the
public schoolhouse. In the land of secular neutrality, religion comes
strolling into the schoolroom unnoticed. When the individual

112. Id.
113. Id. Of course, the school district and the rest of the students who are forced to abandon
their long-standing religious tradition at the command of the Court face actual coercion and
substantive injury.
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community’s version of God (which is much like the Declaration’s) is
taken out, the religions of neutrality are inadvertently brought in. A
total, integrated system of education can never be devoid of moral
values—and values must be integrated from somewhere. If not
theistic values, then humanistic; if not supernatural, then natural—
etcetera. The religions of secular humanism, naturalism and
religious plurality presently provide the framework for the moral
values transmitted in the federally-controlled public schools of
today.114
Indeed, the concept of neutrality is an idealistic cloud that never
can be caught. It is one of the most simplistic and naive schools of
thought ever entertained by the Court. It is a place where all religions
are equal, which means none transcend man—man must become
and remain the measure of all things. The transcendent God of the
Declaration, whom our founders appealed to and trusted in, is now
equal to any god of anyone’s imagination or to the belief in no god at
all. Unfortunately, that system of belief cannot long support the
freedom America has known and enjoyed. Without a firm reliance
upon the God of our unalienable rights, we are left with no rights at
all—merely the fancy of the federal government. Without the
conviction of individual responsibility and duty to the God of the
Declaration, we are left with subjective license, not objective liberty.

114. An anonymous proverb says that, “the philosophy of the schoolroom in one generation
will be the philosophy of the government in the next.” That proverb which is often erroneously
credited to Abraham Lincoln might also be expressed this way: The philosophy in the schoolroom
in one generation will be the philosophy of the culture in the next. Depending on whether you
believe our culture has progressed or digressed in the area of morality, you have the Supreme
Court to either thank or curse. But before you make assessment, consider the question of whether
your present thinking could be a product of the coercive “machinery” of the Court. See McCollum
v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 212, 217 (1948) (establishing “coercion” as a possible impermissible
violation of the Establishment Clause); see also supra text accompanying notes 49–50.
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Application of currently controlling neutrality precedent leads us
to the inescapable conclusion that the United States Declaration of
Independence is unconstitutional and hence, illegal as written.115
(Another possible, and more likely conclusion, however, is that
Supreme Court rulings on establishment cases have been
unconstitutional and hence illegal since 1947.) We, therefore, should
not be surprised at the state of Establishment Clause doctrine and
jurisprudence. Beginning with the spurious command of state
neutrality and prohibition of aiding or preferring religion, to secular
purpose, to non-advancement of religion, to excessive entanglement
with religion, to non-preference of religion over non-religion, to
subjective emotional tests to determine government coercion and
endorsement of religion, we arrive sixty years later at the current
state of establishment doctrine and culture. If the proper gravamen
for establishment constitutionality is neutrality, there could hardly be
a greater violator of the law than the Declaration itself with its appeal
to and firm reliance upon the Creator and “Supreme Judge of the
world.”116
V
THE SENSIBLE ALTERNATIVE:
OVERRULE EVERSON AND LET FREEDOM RING
The observation of Justice Thomas that the time has come to
begin the process of rethinking Establishment Clause jurisprudence
was made in the context of realizing that contemporary doctrine

115. Recognizing the absurd truth of that sentence should goad us on to understand the
absurdities of contemporary establishment doctrine. A revelatory test for the tests is to square
them with the Declaration, observing where and how they conflict.
116. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2, para. 32 (U.S. 1776).
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views the U.S. flag pledge as favoring religion over non-religion; and
thus it renders the pledge illegal.117
In his concurring opinion in Elk Grove, Justice Thomas makes the
argument that the First Amendment’s religion clauses divide between
the states’ rights of non-interference regarding establishment and
individual liberty rights regarding free exercise.118 Therefore, the
learned Justice accepts the following:
[T]he Free Exercise Clause, which clearly protects an individual
right, applies against the States through the Fourteenth
Amendment. But the Establishment Clause is another matter.
The text and history of the Establishment Clause strongly suggest
that it is a federalism provision intended to prevent Congress
from interfering with state establishments. Thus, unlike the Free
Exercise Clause, which does protect an individual right, it makes
little sense to incorporate the Establishment Clause. In any case,
I do not believe that the Pledge policy infringes any religious
liberty right that would arise from incorporation of the Clause.
Because the Pledge policy also does not infringe any free-exercise
rights, I conclude that it is constitutional.119

In the above quote, the Justice accepts the longstanding doctrine
of selective incorporation but concludes that the Establishment
Clause “resists incorporation,” which is another way of saying that
the clause should never have been absorbed and applied against the
states. Since only fundamental rights of individual liberty are
incorporated into the Fourteenth Amendment from the Bill of
Rights, and considering that the Establishment Clause “does not

117. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (“I conclude that, as a matter of our precedent, the Pledge policy is
unconstitutional.”). The flag pledge also prefers monotheistic religion over non-monotheistic
religion inasmuch as it refers to God and not gods.
118. Id.
119. Id. (internal citations omitted).
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protect an individual right,” incorporating the clause is “difficult to
understand.”120
Justice Thomas believes the best argument for finding an
individual, fundamental right within the Establishment Clause
springs from the position that one has a right “to be free from
coercive federal establishments [of religion].”121 Certainly that right
protects the states and, like all federalism provisions, individual
rights are realized. There is no need to incorporate the clause,
however, when it is already fully functional and capable of guarding
against federal encroachment and protecting individual rights.
Under the Thomas view, the Supreme Court would reverse
Everson and thus duly limit itself under the authority of the federal
Establishment Clause and the Tenth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The Court, therefore, would not address the Elk Grove School
District’s pledge policy;122 the federal tribunal would only address the
question of whether Congress had established religion with its
relevant pledge legislation.123
A. Overview of the Doctrine of Incorporation
At this point some background might be in order to extrapolate
the reasoning of Justice Thomas. It is important to remember that
the establishment barrier did not become blurred until the
120. Id. at 50. I would argue that incorporating the Establishment Clause is more than
difficult to understand; it is beyond reason.
121. Id. at 50–51.
122. The California courts would decide the constitutionality of the policy based upon the
California Constitution. That state’s Declaration of Rights employs language strikingly similar to
the First Amendment federalism clause: “The Legislature shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.” CAL. CONST. art. 1 § 4. Precisely what that means would rest with the
ruling of the California Supreme Court, not the federal courts.
123. See H.R. REP. NO. 77-2047, at 1 (1942) (“The purpose of this joint resolution is to provide
an authoritative guide to those civilians who desire to use the flag correctly.”); S. REP. NO. 771477, at 2 (1942) (same).
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Establishment Clause was applied against the states.124 Though
Justice Thomas draws attention to the problems of incorporating one
particular clause, the broader question is aptly phrased as follows:
“Did the 14th Amendment’s due process clause make the Bill of
Rights—originally adopted as limits addressed solely to the federal
government—applicable to the states as well?”125
When the Supreme Court began hearing challenges involving the
novel proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment126 might
incorporate certain rights from the Bill of Rights, the overwhelming
consensus maintained that the purposes of and historic distinctions
between the first ten Amendments and the Fourteenth Amendment
must remain alive. We have already reviewed some of Justice
Marshall’s language, prior to the post-Civil War Amendments,
rejecting the claim that the just compensation provision of the Fifth
Amendment should be applicable to the states—in the 1833 case of
Barron v. City Council of Baltimore.127
The Court’s first assessment of the Fourteenth Amendment
appears in the Slaughter-House Cases, wherein Justice Miller rejected
the claim that the privileges and immunities, due process and equal
124. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 679 (1984) (“The [Establishment] Clause erects a
‘blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier . . . .’” (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614
(1971))).
125. GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 394 (12th ed., Foundation Press, Inc. 1991).
126. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified on July 9, 1868, to fix a specific problem at the
national level. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1873) (emphasizing that the
purposes of the 13th, 14th, and 15th were “the freedom of the slave race, the security and firm
establishment of that freedom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen from
the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlimited dominion over him.”). A national
war had been fought to preserve the union of the states—with the major contention being the
existence of slavery. The 14th Amendment states in its first section: “[N]or shall any State deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. Here we find
specific, enumerated powers delegated to Congress to bring all states into compliance with the
requirements of the post-Civil War Amendment.
127. 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833); see supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text.
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protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment are capable of
expanding beyond their original purpose of eliminating the legal
disparities between former slaves and the rest of the population.128
Interestingly, in Slaughter-House, no claims of incorporating any
provisions from the Bill of Rights were advanced. The Fourteenth
Amendment was properly viewed as a quid pro quo provision which
addressed a specific problem and stood independent of the first ten
federalism Amendments.129 Justice Field, in dissent, argued not only
that the state-authorized business monopoly at issue should have
been broken, but deemed the independent power of the Fourteenth
Amendment capable of doing so.130 Indeed, borrowing Connecticut
precedent, Justice Field cites a state Supreme Court opinion striking
down an impartial state grant which restricted the livelihood of
others. His dissent quotes the Connecticut Court holding that,
“although we have no direct constitutional provision against a
monopoly, yet the whole theory of a free government is opposed to
such grants, and it does not require even the aid which may be
derived from the [Connecticut] Bill of Rights, the first section of
which declares ‘that no man or set of men are entitled to exclusive
public emoluments or privileges from the community,’ to render
them void.”131 It appears Connecticut did have a direct constitutional
provision in the first section of its own Bill of Rights; nevertheless,
the point is that Justice Field did not view the Fourteenth

128. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71–72 (1873).
129. Thus, the Court refused to provide relief, believing that (a) it lacked authority, and (b)
the states were capable of governing themselves through the democratic process. Id. at 82.
130. By independent, the author means an enforcement power autonomous from the Bill of
Rights.
131. Id. at 108–09 (Field, J., dissenting) (quoting Norwich Gaslight Co. v. Norwich City Gas
Co., 25 Conn. 19 (1856)).
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Amendment as requiring the aid of the federalism Bill of Rights to
enforce its purposes.
Justice Field was somewhat on track—the Fourteenth
Amendment does not require the assistance of the Bill of Rights, but
only the aid of Congress to accomplish its purposes.132 In fact, an
often overlooked limitation is that the federal courts have no
authority to enforce the provisions of the Amendment. Indeed,
section five of the Fourteenth Amendment states that “[t]he
Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article.”133 That important clause should limit the
power of the Supreme Court to merely resolving actual cases and
controversies involving the duly enacted legislation of the Congress
in relation to enforcement of the Amendment,134 if and when
necessary. The specific authority delegated to Congress is quite
unique and specific. (Similarly, the specific authority withheld from
Congress in the Establishment Clause is quite unique and specific.)
That specific authority, if followed, ensures that the Fourteenth
Amendment will not produce additional, non-ratified constitutional
amendments in the form of judicial rulings.135 If the word Congress
had retained its meaning in the Fourteenth, it would still mean
Congress in the context of the First Amendment. Enforcing the

132. Unfortunately, the Court was the obstacle to the Fourteenth Amendment’s function in
that after Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1875, the Supreme Court ruled a great deal of
the act unconstitutional. See generally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 25 (1883).
133. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
134. That implies that Congress must give definition to the imprecise requirements of the
Amendment.
135. As Justice Brandeis aptly stated in his dissent in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293
(1926 ): “The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was . . . to save
the people from autocracy.”
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Fourteenth Amendment via its legislation, Congress could not have
incorporated the religion clause.
When the incorporation debate began and developed, two
significant mistakes were made. The first was bypassing the exclusive
authority delegated to Congress, and the second was looking to the
federalism provisions of the Bill of Rights to define the Fourteenth
Amendment.136
The core issue in Barron was whether a clause from the first ten
amendments could be used against the states.137 That notion was
soundly rejected. When the Court considered the question of
incorporation later in Palko v. Connecticut,138 the slope of descent the
Court headed down appeared neither to be very steep nor slippery
because the context provided a natural setting for the Fourteenth
Amendment to find expression. Within an arena relating to what the
Fourteenth Amendment logically requires—protection within the
context of criminal proceedings—the Court considered which rights
were essential to fundamental principles of liberty. There was, of
course, no need to absorb any clause from the Bill of Rights to give
substance to the Fourteenth; but the contrary reasoning seemed
harmless enough at the time.139

136. If the Court had not overruled significant protections of the original Civil Rights Act of
1875, the Fourteenth Amendment would have found immediate legislative definition and
contextual expression. In our context, the federal court looked to the Fourteenth Amendment to
justify its interference in state religion.
137. Barron v. City of Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247 (1833).
138. 302 U.S. 319 (1937). In Palko, the issue was whether the double jeopardy protection of
the Fifth Amendment gives definition and force to the Fourteenth, thus requiring the states to
comply with the federal mandate by federal mandate.
139. In addition to deferring to Congress, the preferred reasoning would have involved
viewing the two independent Amendments as mirroring some of the same protections—with
discrepancies being allowed or resolved by the Democratic process of the states.
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During the early-mid period of the 20th century, Justice Cardozo
and his faction articulated the doctrine of selective incorporation
convincingly enough that it continues to occupy the majority view.140
Justice Black, et al., advocated the doctrine of full-scale incorporation
of the first eight Amendments of the Bill of Rights, believing this
would lend itself to a more objective jurisprudence:
Wholesale incorporation of Bill of Rights guarantees into the 14th
Amendment continues to be rejected by the Court; but the
modern Court’s technique of selective incorporation has achieved
virtually the same result—nearly all of the procedural [and
substantive] protections in the first eight amendments now apply
to the states . . . .141

The irony that Justice Black lived to see is that, by using the Bill of
Rights as inverted precedent, the violence inflicted upon its language
rendered many of its provisions (including the Establishment Clause)
entirely subjective, and thus capable of interpretation by the Supreme
Court alone.
Incorporation began with process and criminal procedure and
incrementally extended into substantive due process, arriving at the
current place whereby individual rights are created from shadows
and penumbras hidden within secret chambers of the Constitution
(and only the priests of the high Court may traverse the sacred
passageways).142
When Justice Thomas says that he accepts the incorporation of
the Free Exercise Clause, but not the Establishment Clause,143 he is

140. See GUNTHER, supra note 125, at 409–11.
141. Id.
142. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (holding that although the
Constitution does not explicitly protect a right to privacy, the specific guarantees within the Bill of
Rights have penumbras that create a zone of privacy free from governmental interference).
143. Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 45 (2004) (Thomas, J., concurring).
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saying that even accepting the current doctrine of incorporating
clauses relating to individual rights, establishment is a federal
prohibition that protects states’ rights. Therefore, the Court may not
legitimately incorporate a state protection that does not primarily
confer individual rights.
Though the reasoning of Justice Thomas is sound, a more
historically satisfying view is that the first ten amendments are all
federalism provisions that protect the states and the people from the
federal government.
B. A High Wall Separates the Bill of Rights from the Fourteenth
Amendment
One cannot overlook the fact that we find two clauses of due
process in the same Constitution.144 Both require the defining
legislation of Congress. With respect to the former, we find federal
rules of criminal procedure, etcetera; and with the second, we find
Congressional acts of civil rights, etcetera.145 The Court’s role is
implicitly limited in the first and expressly limited in the second.
Whatever the due process that the Fourteenth Amendment
requires of the states, its process and scope must find definition from

144. The first, of course, is in the Fifth Amendment and the other in the Fourteenth. The
added language of equal protection in the Fourteenth Amendment makes life, liberty and
property due process functional for a specific group of people. The force of the Fourteenth
Amendment is that the former slaves shall not be denied due process and, of course, process is
meaningless unless all laws are applied equally. The Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
in the Bill of Rights provides protection from the power of the federal government. The unique
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was voted on and ratified to extend federal
power to protect a specific group from inequitable state law. There is no other reason for having
two due process clauses in the same constitution. The Bill of Rights was meant to be an enduring
safeguard for the states—to incorporate the religion clause is to surrender the very liberty the
founders earnestly intended to secure.
145. Part of the Court’s self-inflicted problem is that after Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, the Supreme Court ruled a large amount of the act unconstitutional. See supra note
132 and accompanying text. The Court actually caused the Fourteenth Amendment problem it
later set out to unilaterally resolve.
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Congress; otherwise the Fourteenth Amendment could simply read
as follows: “This amendment makes the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment equally applicable to the states, incorporating all
the rights and restrictions contained in the Bill of Rights.” The first
line of defense against the potential misuse of the Fourteenth
Amendment rests with Congress and the Tenth Amendment.146
Those two sources of authority were meant to be the twin guardians
of the federalism provisions, ensuring that the Bill of Rights
perpetually remains the federalism Bill of Rights. Otherwise, without
distinct federalism provision and operation, our system of
government goes from a federal republic to a centrally controlled
oligarchy—rule (in the area of religious expression) by nine
unelected officials. It was mentioned earlier that the tremors from
the Everson ruling would lead to earth-shaking societal results, but
first the Constitution itself would be shaken by the doctrine of
incorporation.
The Supreme Court, as implied above, transgressed its boundary
line and has gone on to write positive constitutional language. In
order to cross the boundary line at the Bill of Rights, the Court
miraculously parted the Tenth Amendment with its gavel and walked
through on seemingly dry and solid ground. During its quick
passage, the Court, on its way to ravage other amendments, stripped
the Amendment of any real force and effect. The Court, in essence,
eviscerated the power of the Tenth Amendment, girding itself up
with its authority, leaving the amendment naked and empty of
meaning.

146. The Tenth Amendment reads as follows: “The powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to
the people.” U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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So while your present writer agrees with Justice Thomas that the
Establishment Clause resists incorporation, I would argue that every
clause in the Bill of Rights resists incorporation. Indeed, the
Fourteenth Amendment is a provision that stands independent of the
Bill of Rights which must be enforced by the legislation of Congress
alone. Strict construction of the Constitution’s language is necessary
for the same reason the principle is necessary in all matters of judicial
interpretation—the language represents the will of the people.
Express legislative language must be followed and obeyed. It is the
restraining yoke of democracy. The Court has declared substantial
matters of state religious expression unconstitutional without the
counsel of the real Constitution. Certainly, the Constitution would
not have been ratified by the states with a version of the Bill of Rights
as amended by the Court.147
“Government of the people, by the people and for the people”148 is
the battle-cry of the doctrine of federal judicial restraint.149 Under
that view, actual diversity can flourish. Religious values from state to
state, city to city and county to county are free to diverge. Dissenters
of a particular state’s tradition or practice may work through the
democratic process via the state’s legislative body for change—or
through city council or the local school board. In the alternative,
dissenters are free to move to states (or to cities or counties) whose
citizens have similar religious or non-religious values and beliefs.
147. The Constitution hardly would have been ratified without adding the assurance
contained in the First Amendment that the federal government could never meddle with the
religion of the states. The states were once armed with the power of the First Amendment to
ensure their own religious freedoms. Presently, on the contrary, dissenters may employ the power
of the federal government to use the Constitution to control the states, cities, counties and school
districts across the entire country.
148. President Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863) (emphasis added).
149. Realizing that judicial restraint involves discretion, I concede that restraint is not used to
convey what I ultimately argue, but inasmuch as the Court operates with unquestioned
jurisdiction, it has opportunity to abstain from governing the religious affairs of the states.
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VI
CONCLUSION
If following current Supreme Court precedent and thinking
produces the compelling result that the United States Declaration of
Independence contains language that is offensive and prohibited by
the United States Constitution, then certainly, we have a fatal
problem with the state of Establishment Clause doctrine. If that area
of jurisprudence is in fact dead, then let the jurists of the country not
seek to revive a lifeless body of law. Let the corpse be given a
respectful burial and let us start afresh.150
As noted above, Everson was wrongly decided on two points.151
The first was that the Establishment Clause is absorbable and
applicable against the states. And the second was that the clause
requires federal and state neutrality with religion. Rather than
insistently attempting to put a square peg into a round hole, the
Honorable Court will tread honorable ground in admitting the
mistake of Everson.
Certainly, the Court will have to admit a mistake of titanic
proportion and implication—much like it did, looking back to its
early civil rights rulings.152 “If you are on the wrong road,” writes C.
S. Lewis, “progress means doing an about-turn and walking back to
the right road; and in that case the man who turns back soonest is the

150. Concurring in Lamb’s Chapel v. Union Free School District, 508 U.S. 384, 398 (1993),
Justice Scalia wrote that the Lemon test is “like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that
repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad after being repeatedly killed and buried . . . .”
However, even nailing Lemon’s coffin tightly will not solve the Court’s problem unless the entire
fallacious doctrine of government neutrality is buried with it.
151. See supra part III subsection A.
152. See generally Plessey v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Dred Scott v. Sanford 60 U.S. 393
(19 How. 393) (1857). Incidentally, application of the higher law of the Declaration would have
compelled different results in the Court’s early civil rights cases.
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most progressive man.”153 The Court has inflicted Dred-ful wounds
on the nation in the past and suppressing the religious expression of
the nation and her communities for over five decades is likewise no
small matter.154
The present Court must remedy its self-inflicted wound. The
time has come for a majority of the Justices to lay hold of the helm of
the federal bench and steer the Court back to navigable waters.
The practice of incorporation began selectively and grew
incrementally. Likewise, the way back to restoring power to the
states and the people must begin selectively and grow incrementally.
Certainly, there is no better place to begin than with the clause that
protects the religious rights of the individual states from the power of
the centralized government. A declaration of non-jurisdiction over
matters of state religious affairs is the sweet melody that must sound
forth from the Court crier. Sometimes, as Justice Brandeis once said
of the Court, “[t]he most important thing we do is not doing.”155
True religious freedom and diversity will abound only after
centralized control is relinquished. Attempts to immediately remedy
perceived problems through autonomous decrees of the Supreme
Court have caused religious repression, smothering the free
expression that democracy requires.156 When the Court circumvents

153. C. S. LEWIS, MERE CHRISTIANITY 28 (1980).
154. When the Court intervened in a certain political controversy, Justice Breyer, borrowing a
phrase of Justice Hughes, was concerned about risking “a self-inflicted wound—a wound that may
harm not just the Court, but the Nation.” Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 158 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
155. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 71 (1962).
156. It seems that the Court has been on a long-standing crusade in the area of individual
rights (where the heckler is disproportionately exalted) in an effort, perhaps, to compensate for its
initial, morally repulsive rulings on civil rights. Thus, when a heckler cries, “I’m offended,” the
Court sees the issue as an individual religious right (to not be offended) rather than as a
community religious right of free expression of religion. See generally Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39
(1980); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
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the expressed will of the people, its nine members set themselves up
as omniscient philosopher-kings who must govern according to what
only they know is best.
If the Supreme Court will not fix its epic constitutional crisis,
then it may well be time for the People to fix the problem by limiting
the jurisdiction of its nine robe-wearing public servants via their
representative bodies. To the degree America has retained her
conviction that her rights are from God, she will be able to stand
against the overreaching rulings of the federal judicial branch.
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